Filling the Regulatory Void after ERISA: The Third Circuit\u27s Employer First Rule in Coordination of Benefits by Dowd, Aileen A.
Volume 43 Issue 5 Article 4 
1998 
Filling the Regulatory Void after ERISA: The Third Circuit's 
Employer First Rule in Coordination of Benefits 
Aileen A. Dowd 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Retirement Security Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Aileen A. Dowd, Filling the Regulatory Void after ERISA: The Third Circuit's Employer First Rule in 
Coordination of Benefits, 43 Vill. L. Rev. 999 (1998). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol43/iss5/4 
This Issues in the Third Circuit is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger 
School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor 
of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. 
1998]
FILLING THE REGULATORY VOID AFTER ERISA:
THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S "EMPLOYER FIRST" RULE
IN COORDINATION OF BENEFITS
I. INTRODUCTION
In many situations, individuals find themselves covered by more than
one health benefits plan. 1 For example, in households where both
spouses are employed it is common for family members to obtain health
care insurance coverage through each spouse's employer. 2 Moreover,
some individuals hold two jobs and retain benefits under both, and chil-
dren covered as dependents under their parents' plans may also hold ajob
and secure employee benefits. 3 In such cases, many employees believe
that this duplicate coverage will result in dual protection or, at the very
least, adequate protection.4 This false sense of security, however, tragically
dissipates once they file claims that are systematically rejected by both in-
surers.5 Instead of enjoying the abundance of insurance protection they
once envisioned, individuals covered by two health care plans fall victim to
1. See Jack B. Helitzer, Coordination of Benefits: How and Why it Works, 4 BENE-
FIrS L.J. 411, 411 (1991) (asserting that prevalence of duplicate insurance coverage
in modern society is result of "two-wage-earner families"); Roberta Casper Watson
et al., Coordination of Benefits, C552 ALI-ABA 319, 321 (1990) (noting several in-
stances in which individuals may obtain overlapping coverage).
2. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS, GROUP COORDI-
NATION OF BENEFITS MODEL REGULATION, § IV, 120-19, app. B (1997) [hereinafter
NAIC MODEL] ("It is common for family members to be covered by more than one
health plan."); see also McGurl v. Trucking Employees of N. Jersey Welfare Fund,
Inc., 124 F.3d 471, 474 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting that group health care insurance
plans have increasingly included coordination of benefits clauses because enlarged
numbers of two-employee families have increased possibility that claimant could be
covered under multiple plans).
3. See Watson et al., supra note 1, at 321 (asserting examples of duplicated
coverage). Other instances where duplicate coverage may inadvertently occur
arise when a covered employee also maintains coverage through a union or profes-
sional organization. See id. In addition, children of divorced parents may be cov-
ered not only by both natural parents but also by their step-parents. See id. at 322.
Also, an employee who is injured may be entitled to coverage by automobile insur-
ance. See id. Finally, a covered employee may also be entitled to Medicare bene-
fits. See id.
4. See BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R. NEwMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE
COVERAGE DISPUTES § 11.01, at 495 (8th ed. 1995) ("The term 'other insurance' in
the special sense in which it is used in insurance contracts, describes the situation
in which two or more policies of insurance cover the same risk in the name of, or
for the benefit of, the same person.").
5. See generally McGur4 124 F.3d at 471 (involving beneficiary who was denied
payment of claim by both her insurance company and insurance company that
classified her as dependent); Northeast Dep't ILGWU Health & Welfare Fund v.
Teamsters Local Union No. 229 Welfare Fund, 764 F.2d 147, 149-50 (3d Cir. 1985)
(adjudicating denial of claims by insurance companies of beneficiary who is par-
ticipant in one and dependent of other).
(999)
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a legal battle between two insurance companies over which insurer should
pay the claims. 6
On the other hand, some employees manipulate the system to their
benefit by collecting reimbursement from both insurers, effectively turn-
ing a profit from their illness or injury.7 In an attempt to remedy this
situation, many states have enacted legislation that requires insurers to fol-
low a "coordination of benefits" procedure in determining the proportion
each insurer should pay.8 As insurers began to recognize the potential for
6. See generally McGurl, 124 F.3d at 471 (involving beneficiary caught in legal
battle between two insurance companies). But see Lawrence J. O'Connell, North-
east Department ILGWU Welfare Fund v. Teamsters Local No. 229 Welfare Fund:
An End to the Escape Clause as a Method of Coordinating Health Benefits Under ERISA ?, 3
J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 329, 330 (1987) (stating that sometimes dual cov-
erage works in employee's favor in that one may surreptitiously accept reimburse-
ment for more than 100% of covered expenses).
7. See Watson et al., supra note 1, at 321 (positing that duplicate coverage
tempts beneficiaries either to gain profits from injuries or even "seek medical
treatment indiscriminately").
8. See NAIC MODEL, supra note 2, § WY, at 120-19, app. B (noting that many
states have adopted NAIC Model Group Coordination of Benefits Regulation or
comparable legislation). The following is a list of states that have adopted or en-
acted such legislation: ALA. INS. DEPT. REG. No. 56 (1985/1986) (adopting birth-
day rule as of August 29, 1987 that applies in cases where two spouses each retain
separate health benefits and determines which spouse's plan covers couple's chil-
dren by choosing policy of spouse whose birthday falls first in any calendar year,
regardless of age of each spouse); ALASKA BULL. No. 85-3 (1985) (adopting birth-
day rule as of July 1, 1985 and urging adherence to NAIC Model); ARiz. ADMIN.
CODE R20-6-217 (1982/1985) (adopting birthday rule as ofJanuary 1, 1987); ARK.
INS. R. & REG. 21 (1976/1988) (adopting birthday rule as of January 13, 1986);
CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, §§ 2232.52-2232.59 (1986) (adopting birthday rule as of
January 1, 1987); COLO. ADMIN. INS. REG. 4-6-2 (1982/1993) (adopting birthday
rule effective January 1, 1987 and incorporating NAIC Model by reference); CONN.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 38a, §§ 480-1 to 480-7 (1988) (adopting birthday rule effective
April 1, 1988); DEL. INS. REG. 61 (1988) (adopting birthday rule effective October
26, 1988); FLA. STAT. ch. 627.4235 (1992) (adopting birthday rule effective Octo-
ber 1, 1985, and using different coordination rule for Medicare beneficiaries); GA.
ADMIN. COMP. ch. 120-2-48 (1991) (adopting birthday rule effective January 1,
1991); IDAHO CODE §§ 2216, 2141 (1997) (directing adoption of regulation that
substantially follows model, but which also includes individual policies); ILL. AD-
MIN. CODE tit. 50, §§ 2009.10 to 2009.60 (1991) (adopting birthday rule effective
March 22, 1988); IND. ADMIN. CODE tit. 760 R 1-38.1 (1990) (adopting birthday rule
as of July 1, 1988); IowA ADMIN. CODE §§ 191-38.1 to 191-38.11 (1987) (adopting
birthday rule effective April 15, 1987); KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 40-4-34 (1987) (adopt-
ing 1985 version by reference with exceptions as well as birthday rule effective July
1, 1985); 806 Ky. ADMIN. REGS. 18:030 (1987) (adopting birthday rule effective
January 1, 1987); LA. INS. REG. 32 (1998) (adopting birthday rule effective May 5,
1985); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2844 (1986) (adopting enabling statute);
id., § 2332-A (1991) (allowing for coordination with individual and group policies
by nonprofit health services corporations); MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, §§ 361F, 470S
(1991) (allowing coordination with individual and group policies); MAss. REGS.
CODE tit. 211 §§ 38.01-38.10 (1989) (adopting birthday rule effective August 18,
1989); MICH. COMP. LAws §§ 550.251-550.255 (1996) (adopting birthday rule effec-
tive April 1, 1985); MINN. INS. REG. §§ 2742.0100 to 2742.0500 (1986) (adopting
birthday rule effective July 4, 1987); MIsS. INS. REG. LA & H 88-102 (1988) (al-
lowing coordination of benefits); Mo. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 20, § 400-2.030 (1991)
1000
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overlapping coverage, they crafted clauses in their policies purporting to
limit or completely exonerate themselves of all liability in the event that
"other insurance" applied. 9 Appropriately titled "other insurance" clauses,
these provisions arose in three forms: (1) pro-rata, which calls for an ap-
(noting birthday rule effective as of January 1, 1986); MONT. ADMIN. R. 6.6.2401-
6.6.3405 (1987) (adopting birthday rule effective January 1, 1987); NEB. ADMIN. R.
& Regs. tit. 210, ch. 39 (1994) (adopting birthday rule effective January 1, 1987);
NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 689B.063-689B.064 (1987) (noting order of benefit determina-
tion rule only and making birthday rule effective as of July 1, 1987); N.H. CODE
ADMIN. R. ANN. INS. 1904 (1993) (adopting birthday rule effective February 22,
1987); N.J. ADMIN. CODE §§ 11:4-28.1-11:4-28.12 (1988) (adopting birthday rule as
of October 17, 1988); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGs. CODE tit. 11, § 52.23 (1987)
(adopting birthday rule as of January 15, 1987); N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, ch. 12,
§ .0514 (1992) (adopting birthday rule as of July 1, 1986); N.D. ADMIN. CODE
§§ 45-08-01.1 to 45-08-01.2 (1994) (adopting birthday rule effective July 1, 1985);
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3902.11-3902.14 (Banks-Baldwin 1991) (adopting birth-
day rule as of June 29, 1988), OHIo INS. REGS. § 3901-1-56 (1993) (adopting birth-
day rule); OKLA. INS. REGs. §§ 365:10-11-1 to 365:10-11-11 (adopting birthday rule
effective January 1, 1987); OR. ADMIN. R. §§ 836-20-700 to 836-20-765 (1985)
(adopting birthday rule as ofJanuary 1, 1987); R.I. INS. REG. XLVIII (1990) (adopt-
ing birthday rule as of January 1, 1988); S.C. INS. R. 69-43 (1990) (adopting birth-
day rule as of May 24, 1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 58-18A-1 to 58-18A-15 (Michie
1987) (adopting birthday rule as of March 1, 1988); TENN. COMp. R. & REGs. tit.
0780, ch. 1-53 (1987) (adopting birthday rule as of March 1, 1988); 28 TEX. ADMIN.
CODE §§ 3.3501-3.3511 (1994) (adopting birthday rule as of January 1, 1987);
UTAH INS. R590-131 (1994) (adopting birthday rule effective January 1, 1987); VA.
CODE ANN. § 38.2-3543.1 (Michie 1994) (noting authority to adopt birthday rule
regulation); WASH. ADMIN. CODE R. §§ 284-51-010 to 284-51-185 (1994) (adopting
birthday rule effective January 1, 1987); W. VA. CODE STATE R. tit. 114, §§ 114-28-1
to 114-28-8 (1993) (adopting birthday rule effective August 1, 1991); Wis. ADMIN.
CODE § 3.40 (1992) (adopting birthday rule as ofJuly 1, 1986); Wvo. INS. REcs. ch.
10 (1985) (adopting birthday rule as ofJuly 1, 1985). See NAIC MODEL, supra note
2, § IV, at 120-19 to 120-23, app. B. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, which
had not yet passed a regulation adopting the birthday rule, sent a notice to insur-
ers dated August 19, 1986, stating that the June 1985 Coordination of Benefits
guideline adopted by the NAIC would serve as a guide for policy form approval.
See id.
One of the most prevalent difficulties with overlapping coverage in a family
arises when claims are submitted for dependents. See PM Group Life Ins. Co. v.
Western Growers Assurance Trust, 953 F.2d 543, 547-48 (9th Cir. 1992) (involving
incompatible "other insurance" provisions in two self-funded ERISA plans that led
court to adopt birthday rule in determining which parent's insurance plan would
cover their child). For example, if a family consists of two parents who both main-
tain health insurance coverage through their employee benefits plans, which of
the two plans will cover the couple's children? See id. This issue led many states,
prompted by the NAIC, to adopt the birthday rule whereby the plan of the spouse
whose birthday falls first in the calendar year will cover all dependents. See NAIC
MODEL, supra note 2, § IV, 120-17, app. B; see also McGurl, 124 F.3d at 474 (noting
that group health care insurance plans have increasingly included coordination of
benefits clauses because enlarged number of two-employee families has increased
possibility that claimant could be covered under more than one plan).
9. See Marcy Louise Kahn, The "Other Insurance" Clause, 19 FORUM 591, 591
(1984) ("The 'other insurance' clause was designed to resolve much of the confu-
sion which results when more than one insurance policy is applicable to the same
loss."). In every instance, the purpose of the "other insurance" provision is to limit
or even completely eliminate an insurer's liability in the presence of another plan
3
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portionment of the loss between or among the insurers; (2) excess, where
insurers will only offer secondary coverage; and (3) escape, where insurers
relieve themselves of all liability in the presence of other insurance.
10
Although state efforts have increased regulation in an effort to cure
the discrepancies and litigation amassed by "other insurance" provisions,
many insureds remain unaided by state law.1 l For example, individuals
who obtain their health insurance from a self-funded employer fall within
the auspices of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). 12
Enacted by Congress in 1974, ERISA was intended to ensure that em-
ployee benefit plan participants would not be denied their deserved bene-
fits. 1 3 Originally designed to protect employee recipients from the fraud
or insolvency of their employer, ERISA has instead become a shield for
employers and insurance companies. 14 Insurance companies consistently
covering the same loss. See id. at 592 (stating that purpose of clause is to limit or
eliminate carrier's liability where another policy provides coverage for same loss).
10. See id. at 594-95 (noting three basic types of "other insurance" clauses).
For a detailed discussion of the three types of "other insurance" provisions, see
infra notes 25-82 and accompanying text.
11. See Mary Anne Bobinski, Unhealthy Federalism: Barriers to Increasing Health
Care Accessfor the Uninsured, 24 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 255, 349 (1990) (concluding that
ERISA's preemption of state regulatory laws has impeded attainment of health
care coverage); Catherine L. Fisk, The Last Article About the Language of ERISA Pre-
emption? A Case Study of the Failure of Textualism, 33 HARv.J. ON LEGIS. 35, 38 (1996)
(noting that "[i]t is rich irony that ERISA, which was heralded at its enactment as
significant federal protective legislation," has through its preemption provision
been basis for invalidating scores of progressive state laws).
12. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended in 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1461 and in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.); see 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)
(1994)
("The terms 'employee welfare benefit plan' and 'welfare plan' mean any plan,
fund, or program which was... established or maintained by an employer... for
the purpose of providing for its participants or their beneficiaries, through the
purchase of insurance or ... medical [benefits] .... ).
13. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(c). Congress set forth its declaration of policy in
ERISA by stating:
It is hereby further declared to be the policy of this chapter to protect...
the interests of participants in private pension plans and their benefi-
ciaries by improving the equitable character and the soundness of such
plans by requiring them to vest the accrued benefits of employees .... to
meet minimum standards of funding, and by requiring plan termination
insurance.
Id.
14. See O'Connell, supra note 6, at 329 (discussing impact of ERISA on em-
ployee benefit plans). One of the requirements of ERISA is that a fiduciary be
appointed to manage the benefit plans. See id. One of the purposes of this fiduci-
ary is to offset some of the administrative costs incurred by the employer. See id. at
330. In an attempt to manage and achieve cost containment of the benefit plans,
many fiduciaries have subscribed to the coordination of benefits method. See id.
According to the Group Coordination of Benefits Model Regulation, such co-
ordination reduces the duplication of benefits paid to beneficiaries by overlapping
plans. See 1 NAIC MODEL LAws, REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES § 1, 120-1 (Jan.
1996).
1002
4
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 5 [1998], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol43/iss5/4
1998] CASEBRIEF 1003
hide behind ERISA's broad preemption clause that precludes the applica-
tion of all state laws that "relate to" employee benefit plans.
15
Although ERISA affords beneficiaries standing in federal court, it ef-
fectively abandons them in a regulatory vacuum. 16 For example, ERISA
does not account for a coordination of benefits provision, and it does not
offer guidance as to the resolution of such disputes.1 7 "Left with these
sorts of legislative 'gaps' that plague ERISA, it has become incumbent
upon the federal courts to develop a 'federal common law of rights and
obligations under ERISA-regulated plans."1 8
This Casebrief discusses the development of law in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit concerning the treatment of coor-
15. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). The preemption clause of ERISA reads: "[Tlhe
provisions of this subchapter.., shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as
they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan ... ." Id. "State
law" was broadly defined to include "all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other
... action having the effect of law . .. [of any] State, any political subdivisions
thereof, or any agency or instrumentality of either." Id. § 1144(c). Although the
definition of state law was sweeping, the preemption clause was clarified so as not
to include preemption of state insurance, banking or securities law. See id.
§ 1144(b) (2) (B); see also 120 CONG. REC. 29,933 (1974) (setting forth remarks of
Senators Williams and Javits). One of the purposes of ERISA preemption was to
eliminate the threat of conflicting state and local regulation of employee benefit
plans. See id.
Although ERISA affords beneficiaries a cause of action in federal court to
redress their claims, it precludes the application of state law. See CHARLEs G.
BENDA & FAY A. RosovsKy, MANAGED CARE AND THE LAw: LIABILITY AND RISK MAN-
AGEMENT § 4.3 (1996) (noting that ERISA preemption significantly curtails benefi-
ciary's rights to seek redress from insurance fraud).
16. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 41 (1987) (asserting that
ERISA preempts state common law contract and tort claims in employee benefits
cases alleging denial of claims); see also De Bruyne v. Equitable Life Assurance
Soc'y, 920 F.2d 457, 468 (7th Cir. 1990) (involving ERISA preemption of state
claims to federal court); Kanne v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 867 F.2d 489,
493-94 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that ERISA preempts state common law claims
against group health insurer alleging breach of contract, breach of implied cove-
nant of good faith as well as breach of fiduciary and statutory duties); In re Life Ins.
Co., 857 F.2d 1190, 1190 (8th Cir. 1988) (finding that ERISA preempts state claims
against insurer).
17. See PM Group Life Ins. Co. v. Western Growers Assurance Trust, 953 F.2d
543, 546 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting that ERISA does not include coordination of ben-
efits provision). In PM Group, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit recognized that the federal courts are empowered to adopt uniform fed-
eral common law rules in such instances where there are gaps in federal statutory
law. See id. at 546 n.3.
18. McGurl v. Teamsters Local 560 Trucking Employees of N. Jersey Welfare
Fund, 925 F. Supp. 280, 284 (D.N.J. 1996) (quoting Dedeaux, 481 U.S. at 56); see
PM Group, 953 F.2d at 548 (adopting birthday rule as federal common law rule for
resolving coordination of benefits conflicts regarding minor dependents); North-
east Dep't ILGWU Health & Welfare Fund v. Teamsters Local Union No. 229 Wel-
fare Fund, 764 F.2d 147, 154-58 (3d Cir. 1985) (positing that federal common law
must be fashioned to resolve disputes falling within precepts of ERISA where no
such federal law exists).
5
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dination of benefits provisions in insurance contracts.19 Part II unfolds
the history of the three types of "other insurance" provisions and high-
lights their respective roles in insurance law. 20 Part III analyzes the coor-
dination of benefits framework as codified under state law. 2 1 Part III also
discusses coordination of benefits against the backdrop of ERISA preemp-
tion and the regulatory void of federal common law. 22 Part IV highlights
the Third Circuit's recent debut of the "employer first" rule in determin-
ing benefits coordination under ERISA. 23 Finally, Part V offers specula-
tion as to the potential impact of the "employer first" rule on insurance
law. 24
II. FRAMEWORK OF THE "OTHER INSURANCE" PROVISION
Issues involving "other insurance" provisions arise when the same in-
dividual is insured by two or more insurance companies for the same risk
during the same time period.25 Historically, "other insurance" clauses
originated in the property insurance field in an attempt to shield the in-
surer from the moral hazards of fraudulent over-insurance. 26 Frequently,
19. For a discussion of Third Circuit case law that comprises coordination of
benefits insurance law, see infra notes 83-120 and accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of the three types of "other insurance" provisions and
their application in employee benefit plans, see infra notes 25-45 and accompany-
ing text.
21. For a discussion of state regulation of coordination of benefits disputes,
see infta notes 46-66 and accompanying text.
22. For a discussion of ERISA and its preemption provision as well as the fed-
eral common law that has developed to fill the regulatory gap, see infra notes 67-82
and accompanying text.
23. For a discussion of McGurl v. Teamsters Local 560 Trucking Employees of North
Jersey Welfare Fund and the application of the "employer first" rule, see infra notes
83-120 and accompanying text.
24. For a discussion of the impact of the Third Circuit's establishment of the
"employer first" rule, see infra notes 121-24 and accompanying text.
25. See Paul R. Koepff, Other "Insurance" Clauses, 539 PLI/Lrr 249, 252 (1995)
(noting that true "other insurance" difficulties arise only when overlapping cover-
age occurs in presence of two different insurance companies); see also Pacific In-
dem. Co. v. Linn, 766 F.2d 754, 767 (3d Cir. 1985) (setting forth elements of
"other insurance" provisions); Continental Ins. Co. v. McKain, 820 F. Supp. 890,
903 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (asserting that under Pennsylvania law, problem arises when
there are two or more insurance policies simultaneously covering same risk for
same person); Pafco Gen. Ins. Co. v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co., 587 N.E.2d 728,
732-33 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (involving "other insurance" clauses included in poli-
cies to prevent stacking of auto insurance policies).
Overlapping coverage can occur not only when there is concurrent coverage,
but, alternatively, when there is consecutive coverage. See OSTRAGER & NEWMAN,
supra note 4, § 11.01, at 495; see, e.g., Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Trucks Ins. Exch., 797
F.2d 1288, 1290 (5th Cir. 1986) (involving settlement of claim for property damage
covered under two policies where one policy offers only secondary excess
coverage).
26. See R.J. Robertson,Jr., "Other Insurance" Clauses in Illinois, 20 S. ILL. U. L.J.
403, 405 (1996) (noting that property insurers are often at risk of duplicate insur-
ance as result of moral hazard that insured will purchase several policies insuring
1004 [Vol. 43: p. 999
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individuals would purchase several policies covering the same piece of
property and then intentionally destroy the property and collect the entire
loss on each of the policies.27 As insurers grew wise to the scam, they
began to include provisions in their policies that limited their liability in
the presence of "other insurance" policies.28 Generally, these provisions
take one of three forms: (1) pro-rata clauses; (2) excess clauses; and (3)
escape clauses. 2
9
A. Pro-Rata Clauses
Pro-rata clauses usually invoke a "sharing of the loss" method of ap-
portioning liability among the insurers.30 The insurer will agree to pay its
same piece of property and then intentionally destroy property and collect loss
from multiple insurers).
27. See id. (asserting that property insurance fraud gave rise to incorporation
of "other insurance" provisions in policies).
28. See Linda Kogel Hasse, comment, Is There a Solution to the Circular Riddle?
The Effect of the "Other Insurance" Clauses on the Public, the Courts, and the Insurance
Industry, 25 S.D. L. REv. 37, 38-39 (1980) (discussing insurance policy limitations
due to "other insurance" policies). Due to the modern public demand for ex-
panded liability protection among insureds, many insurance companies have
greatly expanded the scope of their coverage. See id. at 39. For example, extended
coverage is realized in automobile policies that cover the insured when he or she is
driving another vehicle (drive-other cars provision). See id.; see also Douglas R.
Richmond, Issues and Problems in "Other Insurance, "Multiple Insurance, and Self-Insur-
ance, 22 PEPP. L. REv. 1373, 1377 (1995) ("Common examples of designed co-in-
surance are the purchase of an umbrella liability policy with specifically scheduled
underlying policies, and the purchase of multi-layered excess coverage above spe-
cifically scheduled primary insurance or self-insurance."). Multiple insurance is an
increasingly common situation and can occur by design or by coincidence. See
OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 4, § 11.01, at 496-97.
Overlapping coverage for the same risk under concurrent policies
generally arises in three different contexts: by design, by coincidence or
by the inadvertent purchase of overlapping coverage. An example of co-
insurance by design is the purchase of a general umbrella/catastrophe
policy with specifically scheduled underlying coverages, and the purchase
of multi-layered excess coverage over specifically scheduled primary or
self-insured coverage. A common example of co-insurance by coinci-
dence occurs when the driver of a non-owned vehicle is covered as a
named insured under his own auto policy as well as under the omnibus
clause of the owner's policy. An inadvertent overlap may arise where
there has been a switch from "occurrence" coverage to "claims made"
coverage and a claim is made during the "claims made" policy period on
the basis of damage that occurred during the "occurrence" policy period.
Id.
29. See OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 4, § 11.02, at 497-500 (listing three
types of "other insurance" provisions).
30. See Robertson, supra note 26, at 408 (noting "sharing of the loss" method
of apportionment employed by pro-rata clauses); see also OSTRAGER & NEWMAN,
supra note 4, § 11.02[a], at 497-98 (discussing pro-rata clauses). An ordinary pro-
rata clause might resemble the following:
If the insured has other insurance against liability or loss covered by this
policy, the company shall not be liable for a greater proportion of such
liability or loss than the applicable limit of liability bears to the total appli-
7
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prorated share of the loss in relation to its respective liability limit.A1 The
theory underlying the pro-rata clause is that the amount of premiums col-
lected by each insurer reflects the amount of risk the insurer assumes.3 2
The required contribution of each insurance carrier is generally de-
termined by one of two methods.3 3 Under the "contribution by equal
shares" method, each insurer contributes "on an equal basis until the limit
of the lower policy is reached [and] additional payments are made by the
remaining insurance companies until the loss is satisfied."3 4 The more
common approach, however, is the "contribution by limits" method in
which each insurer's liability is based on the proportion of each insurer's
policy limit with respect to the combined available coverage.
3 5
B. Excess Clauses
Excess clauses typically provide that an insurer's liability is limited to
the amount by which the loss exceeds the coverage provided by other in-
surers. 36 In other words, as "excess" insurance only, the insurer never in-
tends to be named as the primary insurer unless no other collectible
insurance is available.3 7 In the presence of other insurance, liability for
cable limit of liability of all collectible insurance against such liability or
loss.
Id.
31. See Robertson, supra note 26, at 408 (discussing generally pro-rata
clauses).
32. See Richmond, supra note 28, at 1382 (noting that share of loss is relative
to insurer's liability limit).
33. See Kahn, supra note 9, at 594 (asserting that two common methods exist
for apportioning liability under pro rata scheme).
34. Id. Under the "equal shares" method, consider the following hypotheti-
cal. An insured assumes a loss of $50,000. Policy A has a liability limit of $200,000
and Policy B has a limit of $50,000. Both policies would pay $50,000. See Koepff,
supra note 25, at 257 (using similar example to demonstrate "equal shares"
method).
35. See Kahn, supra note 9, at 594 (describing "contribution by limits" method
of apportionment). Under the "contribution by limits" method, consider the fol-
lowing illustration. An insured assumes a loss of $100,000. Policy A has a liability
limit of $200,000 and Policy B has a limit of $100,000. Total coverage amounts to
$300,000. Policy A would pay $133,333 (2/3 ratio) and Policy B would pay $66,666
(1/3 ratio). See Koepff, supra note 25, at 257 (using hypothetical to demonstrate
"contribution by limits" method of pro-rata contribution).
36. See OSTRAGER & NEwMAN, supra note 4, § 11.02[b], at 498 (describing ex-
cess clauses). A typical excess clause would read:
"Unless otherwise endorsed, this policy shall be excess over any other in-
surance whether prior or subsequent hereto, and by whomsoever ef-
fected, directly or indirectly covering loss or damage insured hereunder,
and this Company shall be liable only for the excess of such loss or dam-
age beyond the amount due from such other insurance, whether collecti-
ble or not, however, not exceeding the limits as set forth in the
Declarations."
Id. (quoting Hasse, supra note 28, at 39 n.18).
37. See 16 GEORGE J. COUCH ET AL., COUCH CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAw
§ 62:48 (2d ed. 1983) (asserting that excess insurer is liable only for amount of loss
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excess insurers does not ensue until the limits of all other policies have
been exhausted.3 8 Notably, difficulties arise when competing policies con-
tain excess clauses and no policy expressly assumes responsibility as pri-
mary insurer.
39
C. Escape Clauses
Escape clauses purport to avoid liability altogether whenever there is
at least one other valid insurance policy.40 Typically, an escape clause in
its truest form asserts that the insurer is relieved of all obligation if other
coverage is available, irrespective of whether the other coverage will ade-
quately sustain the claim.4 1 Often referred to as "super escape clauses,"
these provisions contravene public policy and have been deemed "arbi-
trary and capricious."42 The difficulty with escape clauses lies in the fact
in excess of coverage provided by other insurers). Difficulties arise when there are
multiple insurance policies and each contain "excess clauses." See id. § 62:79 (not-
ing that "if literal effect were given to both excess insurance 'clauses ... neither
policy would cover the loss and such a result would produce an unintended ab-
surdity"). When all competing policies refuse to assume the role of primary in-
surer, courts usually interpret the clauses as mutually repugnant and apply a pro-
rata theory of apportionment. See id. § 62:80 (stating that generally conflicting
excess clauses are disregarded). For a detailed discussion of rules governing the
apportionment of liability in cases of conflicting "other insurance" clauses, see in-fta notes 46-66 and accompanying text.
38. See COUcH ET AL., supra note 37, § 62:48 (stating that policy may also typi-
cally indicate that excess insurer will not reimburse insured for deductible amount
in primary policy); see also McGurl v. Trucking Employees of N. Jersey Welfare
Fund, Inc., 124 F.3d 471, 474 (3d Cir. 1997) (explaining liability of excess clauses).
In McGurl the appellant's insurance policy contained the following excess insur-
ance provision:
[T] his Plan is always a reimbursement plan; if you are covered under an-
other medical plan, this Plan will only take effect when the limits of your
other Plan have been exceeded. This means that you can receive benefits
from this Plan (in the form of reimbursement payments) only after the
other plan pays benefits to the full extent of the terms of that Plan.
Id.
39. See Koepff, supra note 25, at 259 (detailing different questions that may
arise and noting that in some cases, courts will not give effect to excess clauses in
competing policies). For a detailed discussion of rules governing the apportion-
ment of liability in cases of conflicting "other insurance" clauses, see infta notes 46-
66 and accompanying text.
40. See OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 4, § 11.02[c], at 498-99 (describing
escape clauses). A typical escape clause may read: "If any other Assured included
in this insurance is covered by valid and collectible insurance against a claim also
covered by this Policy, he [or she] shall not be entitled to protection under this
Policy." Id.
41. See id. (detailing aspects of escape clauses); see also McGur4 124 F.3d at 474
(containing escape clause that disclaims all liability for employees who are also
covered by other health insurance plans).
42. See Northeast Dep't ILGWU Health & Welfare Fund v. Teamsters Local
Union No. 229 Welfare Fund, 764 F.2d 147, 164 (3d Cir. 1985) (involving em-
ployee benefit plans with competing "other insurance" provisions). The Northeast
court recognized the judicial disdain for escape clauses as it reasoned:
1998] CASEBRIEF 1007
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that beneficiaries are "deprived of [the] compensation that they reason-
ably anticipate under the plan's purported coverage." 43 The inequity is
exacerbated in situations where the insured is unsuspectingly covered
under two policies.44 A common example of such overlapping insurance
occurs when the driver of a vehicle not owned by him or her is inadver-
tently covered as a named insured under his or her personal auto insur-
ance as well as the omnibus clause of the owner's policy.45
III. COORDINATION OF BENEFITS
A. Resolving "Other Insurance" Clauses in Competing Policies
In the early 1900s, courts fashioned a number of rules to assign liabil-
ity to resolve conflicts between "other insurance" clauses from competing
policies. 46 Some courts followed the "first in time" rule whereby the policy
with the earliest effective date was deemed the primary insurer and subse-
Underlying the judicial hostility toward escape clauses appears to be the
sentiment that insureds who reasonably expect a certain level of insur-
ance coverage should not be unexpectedly deprived of such coverage
when one insurer attempts to avoid liability by shifting it to another
whose policy terms may be much less favorable to the insured.
Id. at 162.
43. Id. at 163. In Northeast, the Third Circuit decided, in a matter of first
impression, that the incorporation of an escape clause in an ERISA-governed
health benefits plan is unenforceable because it represented arbitrary and capri-
cious conduct by the plan trustees. See id. at 164 (noting that such conduct on part
of plan trustees is violation of their fiduciary duties); see also Fryer v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 573 A.2d 225, 228 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) ("Our reading of the law convinces us
that the . . . policy provisions must be enforced as if the escape clause did not
exist.").
44. See OSTRAGER & NEwMAN, supra note 4, § 11.01, at 496 (noting that over-
lapping coverage for same risk under concurrent policies generally arises in three
different contexts: by design, by coincidence or by inadvertent purchase of over-
lapping coverage).
45. See id. (denoting instances in which overlapping insurance may occur by
coincidence).
46. See Robertson, supra note 26, at 410-12 (describing early methods em-
ployed by courts to apportion liability in cases where two policies had conflicting
clauses). One commentator noted the six common scenarios involving cases liti-
gating policies with "other insurance" clauses: (1) escape/escape; (2) escape/ex-
cess; (3) escape/ pro-rata; (4) excess/excess; (5) excess/pro-rata; and (6) pro-
rata/pro-rata. See id. at 410 (listing possible conflicts between competing insur-
ance clauses). The commentator then went on to describe how "all of these older
approaches either expressly or implicitly recognized that in virtually all cases in-
volving overlapping coverage, it was not possible to give literal effect to the 'other
insurance' clauses in each policy." Id. at 412. The commentator also noted that
the older approaches were largely unmanageable and failed to give effect to either
the plain language of the policies or the intent of the parties. See id. (noting that
although "few of the criteria [for these methods] made any sense ... courts utiliz-
ing these methods were not so misguided as to suggest that they were merely 'in-
terpreting' the policy language or giving effect to the 'intent of the parties'").
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quent policies were termed secondary or excess. 47 Other courts held that
the policy that more specifically or directly covered the ,incident was the
primary insurer, whereas the policy that only extended general coverage
was deemed excess. 4 8 Still other cases exhibited the tendency of courts to
apply a "primary tortfeasor" method whereby the insurer of the primary
tortfeasor assumed the role of primary insurer and other policies contrib-
uted only excess coverage. 49 Nevertheless, these methods have been dis-
credited and replaced with modern rules of apportionment.50
Modern courts have abandoned older methods of assigning liability
and often revert to discerning the intent of the parties or prorating the
liability among the insurers.5 1 This is particularly the case when compet-
ing policies contain the same type of "other insurance" clause.52 For in-
stance, it is clear that when both policies contain pro-rata clauses, the
courts will subject each insurer to a percentage of the loss based on the
proportional coverage each policy provides.53 If both policies contain ex-
47. See id. at 410-11 (describing "First in Time" rule); see, e.g., New Amsterdam
Cas. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 108 F.2d 653, 656 (6th Cir. 1940)
(holding that policy with earlier effective date is deemed primary insurance).
48. See Robertson, supra note 26, at 411 (describing "specific" method of ap-
portioning liability as compared to "general" method); see also Fageol Truck &
Coach Co. v. Pacific Indem. Co., 117 P.2d 661, 668-69 (Cal. 1941) (applying spe-
cific versus general rule in apportioning liability).
49. See Robertson, supra note 26, at 411 (describing apportionment method
in which primary tortfeasor's insurer becomes primary insurer); see also American
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Penn Mut. Indem. Co., 161 F.2d 62, 62-63 (3d Cir. 1947) (holding
insurer of primary tortfeasor primarily liable); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Bankers In-
dem. Ins. Co., 200 N.E. 849, 851 (Ohio Ct. App. 1935) (same); cf Oregon Auto.
Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 195 F.2d 958, 959-60 (9th Cir. 1952)
(comparing methods used by courts to apportion liability).
50. See Robertson, supra note 26, at 410, 412 (noting that older apportion-
ment methods are "now almost universally discredited" as they are mostly based on
nonsensical criteria). One commentator also pointed out that none of the histori-
cal methods of apportioning liability utilized a proration method whereby insurers
would share liability. See id. at 412 (noting that characteristic of older methods was
that one insurer provided primary coverage while other insurer, merely provided
excess).
51. See Hasse, supra note 28, at 42 (noting that most courts will focus on lan-
guage of policies and attempt to determine intent of contracting parties to recon-
cile conflicting clauses).
52. See id. (noting that where applicable portions of two conflicting "other
insurance" clauses are identical, courts almost always require insurers to apportion
liability).
53. See Richmond, supra note 28, at 1388 (noting that when both policies con-
tain pro-rata clauses, traditional rule has been to hold insurers liable for propor-
tion of subject loss that face amount of each insurer's policy bears to total amount
of valid and collectible insurance); see also Cargill, Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins.
Co., 889 F.2d 174, 179-81 (8th Cir. 1989) (apportioning liability in pro-rata fash-
ion); Compton v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 870 P.2d 545, 547-48 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1993) (involving action brought against automobile insurer to recover differ-
ence between total damage claim arising out of accident and amount paid by in-
surer and other carriers for uninsured motorists); General Accident Ins. Co. v.
United States Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Co., 602 N.Y.S.2d 948, 951-52 (App. Div. 1993)
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cess clauses, however, an interpretation of the clauses is circular and use-
less because both policies purport to provide only secondary coverage.
54
Therefore, courts will generally dismiss the excess clauses as "mutually re-
pugnant" and against public policy, and will simply prorate the loss be-
tween the insurers.5 5 Finally, a literal interpretation of two policies
containing escape clauses connotes that neither insurer provides any pro-
tection at all. 56 As expected, courts will generally preclude insurers from
(involving claim brought by comprehensive general liability insurer against auto-
mobile insurer in which court held that insurers provided primary coverage and
liability was determined based on pro-rata provisions of policies); Tarolli v. Conti-
nental Cas. Co., 581 N.Y.S.2d 510, 511 (App. Div. 1992) (holding that coverage
provided by both insurers was primary and therefore pro-rata apportionment of
liability ensued); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 429 S.E.2d 406,
409-10 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that "other insurance provisions" in insur-
ance contracts were mutually repugnant and applying pro-rata method of alloca-
tion of risk); Equity Mut. Ins. Co. v. Spring Valley Wholesale Nursery, Inc., 747
P.2d 947, 955 (Okla. 1987) (noting that loss shall be shared by insurers where
policies contain pro-rata or "other insurance" clauses, although private agreements
between parties assigning primary liability may be considered "when concurrent
commercial policies all provide primary coverage for the same loss"); Mission Ins.
Co. v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 683 P.2d 215, 220 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984) (apportioning
liability under pro-rata method in case where policies of both insurers were consis-
tent in authorizing "policy limits method" of apportionment).
The contribution by limits method of apportionment used in the above cases
has been the target of criticism by those who suggest that the premium paid for an
insurance policy does not always reflect the amount of coverage the policy pro-
vides. See Richmond, supra note 28, at 1388-89 (noting that one criticism of contri-
bution by limits method is that "it ignores the economic reality that the cost of
insurance does not increase proportionately with policy limits"). Moreover, many
courts have instead relied on a contribution by shares method in appropriating
liability. See id. at 1389 (noting judicial preference for contribution by shares
method); see, e.g., Reliance Ins. Co. v. Saint Paul Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 753 F.2d
1288, 1292 (4th Cir. 1985) (applying District of Columbia law providing for contri-
bution by shares).
54. See COUCH, ET AL. supra note 37, § 62:48 (asserting that excess insurer is
only liable for amount of loss in excess of coverage provided by other insurers).
55. See Richmond, supra note 28, at 1389 (noting general trend of courts to
dismiss two excess clauses as "mutually repugnant" and to prorate loss); see also
Indiana Ins. Co. v. Mission Nat'l Ins. Co., 874 F.2d 631, 634 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting
that where two excess policies are "mutually repugnant," both insurers will be held
proportionately liable for loss); Hennes Erecting Co. v. National Union Fire Ins.
Co., 813 F.2d 1074, 1077 (10th Cir. 1987) (asserting that Kansas has traditionally
followed majority rule in discarding mutually repugnant excess clauses); Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pacific Indem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 140, 143 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (involv-
ing conflicting excess clauses where court gave effect to neither clause and appor-
tioned liability based on limits of each policy).
56. See Hasse, supra note 28, at 42 (stating that "a literal interpretation of the
policies containing . . . identical escape clauses would leave the insured without
any coverage where it first appeared that he [or she] had double protection"). See
generally Northeast Dep't ILGWU Health & Welfare Fund v. Teamsters Local
Union No. 229 Welfare Fund, 764 F.2d 147 (3d Cir. 1985) (involving employee
benefit plans with competing "other insurance" provisions). For a discussion of
the Northeast court's disdain for escape clauses, see supra note 42 and accompany-
ing text.
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asserting complete exculpation and, instead, strike the clauses and prorate
the loss.
5 7
In the event that competing plans contain different clauses, most
courts will attempt to reconcile the plans by trying to discern the intent of
the parties. 58 Because policies with pro-rata clauses indicate that insurers
In Northeast, the Third Circuit declared that the incorporation of an escape
clause in an ERISA-governed health benefits plan is unenforceable because it rep-
resents arbitrary and capricious conduct by the plan trustees. See Northeast, 764
F.2d at 164 (noting that escape clauses in health plans represent violation of fiduci-
ary duty on part of plan trustees); see also Fryer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 573 A.2d 225,
227-28 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (holding that policy provisions amounted to "an un-
enforceable escape clause").
57. See OSTRAGER & NEwMAN, supra note 4, § 11.03[c] [3], at 504-05 (noting
that when conflicting policies both contain escape clauses, majority rule holds that
insurers are co-insurers); see also Underwriters at Lloyd's, London v. Pike, 977 F.2d
1278, 1280 (8th Cir. 1992) (prorating loss between two insurers that issued fire
insurance policies that both contained escape clauses); Guidry v. CSI Blasters/
Painters, Inc., 921 F.2d 275, 275 (5th Cir. 1990) (affirming district court's decision
to prorate loss equally); Richmond, supra note 28, at 1391 (noting that when two
policies contain conflicting escape clauses courts generally deem clauses mutually
repugnant and prorate loss between insurers).
58. See Richmond, supra note 28, at 1392 ("When faced with dissimilar 'other
insurance' clauses, most courts attempt to reconcile the clauses in a manner that
will give effect to the intent of the parties."). A minority ofjurisdictions subscribe
to the approach that all "other insurance" provisions, both similar and dissimilar,
are "mutually repugnant" and unenforceable. See OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note
4, § 11.03[d] [2], at 510-13 (noting minority jurisdictions that refuse to reconcile
conflicting "other insurance" clauses). This view originated in Lamb-Weston, Inc. v.
Oregon Automobile Insurance Co., 341 P.2d 110 (Or. 1959), in which the Oregon
Supreme Court considered a conflict between a pro-rata clause and an excess
clause. See id. at 119 (apportioning liability equally in light of competing pro-rata
and excess clauses). The court reasoned that the loss should be apportioned
equally because each policy would have had to foot the entire bill in the absence of
other insurance carriers. See id. at 113 (noting that both parties conceded "that if
the other was not an insurer against this occurrence [sic] then it would be liable
for the full amount"). Although the Lamb-Weston doctrine seems to impugn practi-
cality in the resolution of "other insurance" disputes, the approach has garnered
much criticism from courts that favor strict interpretation of contractual language.
See Hasse, supra note 28, at 46 (stating that this rule ignores "a basic rule of con-
tracts requiring consideration of all the language in a policy to determine its mean-
ing and intent"). Notably, the Oregon Supreme Court in Lamb-Weston merely
reiterated what the Ninth Circuit had articulated seven years earlier in Oregon Auto
Insurance Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 195 F.2d 958 (9th Cir. 1952).
See Hasse, supra note 28, at 45-46 (noting that Oregon Supreme Court followed
precedent set by Ninth Circuit).
Some courts apply the Minnesota Rule, which applies a three-prong test to
determine which insurer is "closest to the risk." See Koepff, supra note 25, at 271-72
(describing aspects of test, such as consideration of "total insuring intent" and
which insurer is "closest to the risk"). The courts consider: (1) which policy more
specifically insures against the cause of the accident; (2) which policy equitably
assumes greater exposure or risk based on premium paid; and (3) which policy
maintains the risk as the primary focus. See id. at 272 (noting three elements of
Minnesota test); see, e.g., American Family Ins. v. National Cas. Co., 515 N.W.2d
741, 745-46 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (noting that pro-rata and excess clauses in ap-
plicable insurance policies conflicted and choosing to allocate liability to policy
1998] CASEBRIEF 1011
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anticipated paying a fair share of the loss, courts will usually enforce excess
and escape clauses in the presence of a pro-rata clause.59 This means that
the pro-rata clause will trigger full payment up to the policy limit and
either an excess clause will cover the remainder or an escape clause will
exculpate an insurer from all liability.60
Adjudication becomes more difficult when a court addresses compet-
ing excess and escape clauses because both policies deny primary liabil-
ity. 6 1 The majority approach is to grant full effect to the excess clause and
thereby impose primary liability on the policy containing the escape
clause. 6 2 The Third Circuit's holding in Insurance Co. v. Continental Casu-
that was closer to risk because it demonstrated "total policy insuring intent" to
provide primary coverage).
59. See, e.g., American Interinsurance Exch. v. Commercial Union Assurance
Co., 605 F.2d 731, 736 (4th Cir. 1979) (showing deference to excess clause policy,
thus requiring pro-rata policy to assume primary liability); P.L. Kanter Agency, Inc.
v. Continental Cas. Co., 541 F.2d 519, 522-23 (6th Cir. 1976) (requiring pro-rata
policy to make payment as primary insurer in presence of excess insurer). See gen-
erally Alta Cal. Reg'l Ctr. v. Fremont Indem. Co., 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 841, 847 (Ct.
App. 1994) (holding that insurer that initially contends policy does not cover par-
ticular situation does not waive defense that coverage is only excess if coverage is
later found to exist), overruled by Waller v. Truck Ins. Exch., Inc., 900 P.2d 619 (Cal.
1995) (overruling Alta only to extent that it relied on McLaughlin v. Connecticut
General Life, 565 F. Supp. 434 (N.D. Cal. 1983), and its rule of automatic waiver);
Harleysville Ins. Co. v. Crum & Forster Personal Ins., 588 A.2d 385, 388-89 (NJ.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (obligating pro-rata policy to pay up to policy limits
before invoking payment by insurer with excess policy).
60. See, e.g., McFarland v. Chicago Express, Inc., 200 F.2d 5, 7-8 (7th Cir.
1952) (giving effect to escape clause in one policy over pro-rata clause of other
policy); Efferson v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 816 F. Supp. 1103, 1119-20
(E.D. La. 1993) (giving effect to escape clause and hence holding insurer with pro-
rata clause primarily liable); cf Air Transp. Mfg. Co. v. Employers' Liab. Assurance
Corp., 204 P.2d 647, 650 (Cal. Ct. App. 1949) (opining that escape clause should
not be given effect because it was only intended to operate if other insurance is
unconditional).
61. See Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Farmers' Ins. Exch., 444 S.W.2d
583, 588-89 (Tex. 1969) (recognizing confusion imposed by conflicting policy
clauses). In Hardware Dealers, the court recognized the difficulty imposed by "other
insurance" clauses by stating:
The many methods employed for the solution of the problem of double
coverage by conflicting clauses have produced much confusion .... To
solve the problem by picking up one policy, and reading it with a result
which would be opposite to that reached if the other policy were first
picked up, is a solution which does not satisfactorily solve the circular
riddle.
Id. (citation omitted).
62. See Grasberger v. Liebert & Obert, Inc., 6 A.2d 925, 926 (Pa. 1939) (involv-
ing conflicting excess and escape clauses). In Grasberger, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court refused to enforce an escape clause in the presence of an excess
clause. See id. (holding that "the [escape] clause ... is not applicable, because, up
to the amount of the coverage of the policy, defendant is not covered by other
insurance"). The result was to enforce liability against the policy that attempted to
escape responsibility altogether. See id. (giving effect to excess clause in one policy,
thus making policy with escape clause primarily liable). The holding in Grasberger
has come to be known as the majority view. See COUCH ET AL., supra note 37,
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alty Co.63 comports with this majority approach. 64 The Insurance Co. court
determined that the entire loss in a wrongful death action should be
borne by the insurer that sought to avoid any liability by invoking its es-
cape clause. 65 The decision reiterated the popular belief that escape
clauses contravene public policy by attempting to deny all responsibility
and, therefore, should be read out of an insurance policy.6
6
B. The Role of ERISA
A fundamental tenet of ERISA is its preemption of all state law "relat-
ing to" employee benefits insurance plans.6 7 As a result, the established
doctrine of insurance law regarding "other insurance" provisions is effec-
tively rendered moot, and courts are free to fashion federal common law
§ 62.76 (stating that "as a general trend" courts are holding that "the insurer who
has the no-liability clause will be primary to the excess clause insurer"); see also
Insurance Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 575 F.2d 1070, 1073 (3d Cir. 1978) (follow-
ing Grasberger holding and assigning primary liability to escape policy rather than
excess policy).
63. 575 F.2d 1070 (3d Cir. 1978).
64. See id. at 1074 (holding that escape clause will not be given effect but
excess clause will be given effect). Insurance Co. involved two insurance companies
engaged in the settlement of a wrongful death action. See id. at 1071. One policy
contained an excess clause and the other policy contained an escape clause. See id.
at 1072. The district court declared that the two "other insurance" provisions were
mutually repugnant, struck both clauses from the respective policies and pro-rated
the loss between the two insurers. See id. at 1071 (characterizing both provisions as
"excess" clauses). The Third Circuit determined, however, that in the wake of
Grasberger, an escape clause should not be enforced in the presence of an excess
clause and that the escape clause should be stricken from the policy. See id. at
1073-74 (refusing to distinguish Grasberger on basis that provision in question
might constitute "super-escape" clause as opposed to mere "escape" clause). Con-
sequently, the court assigned full liability for the entire loss to the insurer that
tried to invoke its escape clause and upheld the excess clause. See id. at 1074 (giv-
ing escape clause no effect).
65. See id. (noting that holding protects interests of insureds and defers to
holding in Grasberger).
66. See Richmond, supra note 28, at 1394 (noting that court may follow tradi-
tional rule and deem policy with escape clause to be primary and require its ex-
haustion before applying policy with excess clause due to fundamental judicial
dislike for escape clauses regardless of circumstance).
67. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1994). ERISA preemption focuses on three clauses
within the statute. See id. § 1144(a)-(c) (discussing preemption, savings and
deemer clauses). The preemption clause identifies those state laws that will be
preempted by ERISA. See id. § 1144(a) (discussing preemption clause). The sav-
ings clause saves from preemption all those laws that purport to regulate insur-
ance, banking or securities. See id. § 1144(b) (2) (A) (discussing savings clause).
Finally, the deemer clause limits the application of the savings clause by providing
that no employee benefit plan will be considered an insurance company for the
purpose of being regulated by the respective state laws. See id. § 1144(b) (2) (B)
(discussing deemer clause). Moreover, ERISA defines state law to include "all laws,
decisions, rules, regulations or other State action having the effect of any law, of
any State." Id. § 1144(c) (1).
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to replace existing state law. 68 One commentator stated, "The issue be-
comes blurred because, although ERISA is a comprehensive and reticu-
lated statute, no systematic manner of dealing with the coordination of
health benefits-either between competing non-insured ERISA plans, or
between an insured and a non-insured plan-is provided by the statute."
69
One important concept to consider is that ERISA does not prescribe
which benefits an employer must offer, but rather controls the administra-
tion of an established plan. 70 Therefore, a coordination of benefits
scheme is essential to a court's reconciliation of such disputes under
ERISA.
7 1
The Third Circuit has decided two seminal cases concerning coordi-
nation of benefits and ERISA. 72 In Northeast Department ILGWU Health &
Welfare Fund v. Teamsters Local Union No. 229 Welfare Fund,73 the court con-
sidered whether an escape clause inserted in a multi-employer benefit
plan by trustees of that plan violated ERISA.74 A unanimous court struck
68. See McGurl v. Trucking Employees of N. Jersey Welfare Fund, Inc., 124
F.3d 471, 481 (3d Cir. 1997) ("Thus, by preempting any law that even relates to
ERISA plans Congress anticipated the development of a 'federal common law of
rights and obligations under ERISA-regulated plans."' (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co.
v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987))); see also Wayne Chem., Inc. v. Columbus
Agency Serv. Corp., 426 F. Supp. 316, 322 (N.D. Ind.) ("Where state law is pre-
empted and no specific federal provision governs, a 'court is forced to make law or
leave a void where neither state nor federal law applies."' (quoting Note, The Fed-
eral Common Law, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1512, 1522 (1969))), affd, 567 F.2d 692 (7th
Cir. 1977).
69. Watson et al., supra note 1, at 363 (footnote omitted).
70. See Hlinka v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 863 F.2d 279, 283 (3d Cir. 1988)
(declaring that ERISA is not concerned with design of benefit plan, but rather
administration of plan) (citing Viggiano v. Shanango China Div. of Anchor Hock-
ing, 750 F.2d 276, 279 (3d Cir. 1984)). In Hlinka, the court determined that a
fiduciary could determine whether it would allow an employee to take advantage
of an early retirement package without violating the precepts of ERISA. See id. at
279 (holding that pension provision allowing for early retirement that was deemed
to be in employer's interest did not violate ERISA).
71. See id. (describing problems courts must resolve in order to reconcile
competing insurance clauses).
72. See McGurl, 124 F.3d at 471 (adjudicating dispute between two ERISA-gov-
erned employee benefits plans containing respective escape and excess clauses);
see also Northeast Dep't ILGWU Health & Welfare Fund v. Teamsters Local Union
No. 229 Welfare Fund, 764 F.2d 147, 164 (3d Cir. 1985) (dismissing escape clauses
as unenforceable in light of ERISA).
73. 764 F.2d 147 (3d Cir. 1985).
74. See id. at 149-50 ("Finally, we conclude that the decision ... to incorporate
an escape clause in a benefit plan . . .constitutes arbitrary and capricious con-
duct."). Northeast involved an employee in the garment industry who was a partici-
pant in her own employer-provided plan as well as a beneficiary of her husband's
employee benefit plan. See id. at 150. Both plans fell within the purview of ERISA.
See id. In March of 1981, Mrs. Fazio, the garment industry employee, underwent
surgery and subsequently submitted her claims to her own employee benefit plan.
See id. Her plan, however, informed her that she was not eligible for benefits be-
cause her husband's plan also covered her and, therefore, according to the escape
clause in her own plan, her insurer would not be liable in the presence of other
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down the escape clause as unenforceable because it represented arbitrary
and capricious conduct on the part of the plan fiduciaries. 75 Escape
clauses clearly subvert the hallmark purpose of ERISA-namely, to pro-
tect employees from the fraud of their employers.
76
Recently, the Third Circuit again addressed a coordination of benefits
dispute in McGurl v. Trucking Employees of North Jersey Welfare Fund, Inc.77 At
issue was an apparent conflict between "other insurance" provisions in two
ERISA-governed plans, each of which purported to provide at most secon-
dary coverage to the claimants. 78 To resolve the conflict, the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey crafted a federal com-
mon law order-of-benefits determination rule.79 The rule imposes pri-
mary liability on the plan under which the claimants are covered as
employees.80 Secondary coverage is imposed on plans that cover claim-
valid insurers. See id. at 150-51. When Mrs. Fazio submitted her claims to her hus-
band's plan, the plan informed her that according to the excess clause in the bene-
fits contract, they reserved the right to defer primary liability to any other valid
insurer and would only assume secondary responsibility. See id.
75. See id. at 163 ("An 'other insurance' clause in a [sic] ERISA-covered bene-
fit plan is therefore enforceable unless it reflects an arbitrary and capricious judg-
ment by the plan's trustees. We believe that the incorporation of escape clauses in
benefit plans reflects such impermissible conduct.").
76. See id. (noting that major impetus for Congress' enactment of ERISA was
alarming frequency with which employees who had been promised welfare or re-
tirement benefits by employers were deprived of anticipated benefits due to ineq-
uitable character or financial instability of their benefit plans).
77. 124 F.3d 471 (3d Cir. 1997). McGurl involved a group of claimants who
were covered under a benefit plan (Local 1262 Funds) as employees of a super-
market as well as under another plan (TENJ Plan) as dependents of other em-
ployees of various supermarkets. See id. at 473. The dispute concerned the
responsibilities of the plans with respect to obligations to part-time employees who
were covered by both plans. See id. at 474..
78. See id. The Local 1262 Funds plan contained an excess clause while the
TENJ Plan contained an escape clause. See id. The district court stated that the
"other insurance" provisions in the two plans were "mutually repugnant" as both
attempted to deny primary coverage. See McGurl v. Teamsters Local 560 Trucking
Employees of N. Jersey Welfare Fund, 925 F. Supp. 280, 287 (D.N.J. 1996).
79. See McGur4 925 F. Supp. at 290-91 (recognizing that any rule that court
adopted must be one that ensures predictability and uniformity in application so
as to protect benefits plans from forced liability of unanticipated claims).
80. See id. at 291 ("'[T]he benefits of the plan which covers the person as an
employee ... are determined before those of the plan which covers the person as a
dependent.... .'" (quoting NAIC MODEL, supra note 2, § 5B[1])); see also Starks v.
Hospital Serv. Plan, 440 A.2d 1353, 1355 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981) (deter-
mining that where claimant is covered by one plan as direct beneficiary and other
plan as mere dependent, former plan assumes primary liability), affd, 453 A.2d
159 (N.J. 1982). In Starks, the court addressed the coordination of benefits plan
set forth in Blue Cross and Blue Shield (BCBS) group contracts. See id. Under the
BCBS plan, in the presence of a competing "other insurance" provision rendering
the other insurer as secondary or excess, BCBS will assert primary responsibility
according to the following three guidelines. See id. First, where a claimant is cov-
ered as a direct beneficiary by one plan and as a dependent beneficiary by another
plan, the former will assume primary liability. See id. Second, regarding children,
the insurance carrier covering the father will assume primary responsibility before
17
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ants as merely dependents of other covered employees.8 1 In establishing
the "employer first" rule, the Third Circuit followed the lead of the Na-
tional Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) Model Regulation
for the coordination of benefits.
8 2
IV. THIRD CIRCUIT JURISPRUDENCE
The Third Circuit's decision in Northeast reflects adherence to state
common law coordination of benefits. 83 In accord with the approach
taken in Starks v. Hospital Service Plan,8 4 the Third Circuit formulated a
two-step process in resolving "other insurance" disputes.8 5 The court first
focused on the intent of the contracting parties and discerned that the
excess and escape clauses in the respective plans were clearly incompati-
ble.8 6 In light of this incompatibility, the court attempted to reconcile the
clauses with the precepts and policies of ERISA.8 7 Generally, the court
posited that "other insurance" clauses in ERISA-covered plans are enforce-
able unless they reflect an arbitrary and capricious judgment by the plan's
trustees.8 8 It is precisely the inequitable character reflected in plans with
escape clauses, which try to defer all liability, that constitutes this arbitrary
and capricious conduct.89 After careful consideration of ERISA's purpose
the mother's carrier. See id. Third and finally, in the event that the two previous
rules do not apply, the plan that has covered the claimant for the longest period of
time will pay first. See id.
81. See McGur, 925 F. Supp. at 291 (citing Helitzer, supra note 1, at 414
("[T]he plan covering the person as an employee pays benefits first. The plan
covering the same person as a dependent pays benefits second.")).
82. See NAIC MODEL, supra note 2, § 5(B). The Model Regulation sets forth a
comprehensive scheme that eliminates the confusion and hassle of benefits deter-
mination and payment delays in the presence of "other insurance" clauses by sug-
gesting that all coordination of benefits comport with this regulation. See id. § 2.
83. See Starks, 440 A.2d at 1358 (providing that parties' intentions should be
discerned before applying coordination of benefits rules).
84. 440 A.2d 1353 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981).
85. See id. at 1358. The Starks court stated, "[T] he judicial task is first to deter-
mine from the contracts themselves what obligations the respective obligors in-
tended to assume and then to determine whether these intentions are compatible
... with the insured's rights and expectations and with the controlling demands of
public policy." Id.
86. See Northeast Dep't ILGWU Health & Welfare Fund v. Teamsters Local
Union No. 229 Welfare Fund, 764 F.2d 147, 161 (3d Cir. 1985). The two "other
insurance" provisions were incompatible based on the fact that the excess clause in
one plan defers primary liability to a second plan that has an escape clause which
denies all liability in the presence of any other plan. See id.
87. See id. (construing "other insurance" provisions and determining their
compatibility is only first step of two-step analysis and noting that "other insurance"
clauses are enforceable only if they are consonant with provisions and policies of
ERISA).
88. See id. at 163 (asserting that "other insurance" clauses in ERISA-covered
benefit plans are enforceable unless deemed arbitrary and capricious).
89. See id. (believing incorporation of escape clauses to be arbitrary and capri-
cious conduct).
1016 [Vol. 43: p. 999
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of protecting employees' entitlements, the court chose to adopt the state
common law majority rule and dismiss the escape clause as
unenforceable.9 0
The Starks court noted that many state courts, when faced with a con-
flict between an escape clause and an excess clause, have chosen t6 invoke
the former as the primary insurer.9 ' Once the escape clause was struck
from the defendant's plan, the court found that the policy could be inter-
preted as assuming primary responsibility.92 In dismissing the escape
clause as arbitrary and capricious, the Third Circuit acknowledged the
possibility of adopting a less drastic remedy.9 3 The court, however, de-
clined to do so, warning that such a holding might be interpreted as a
qualified endorsement of escape clauses. 94
The court's adamant rejection of escape clauses is seemingly at odds,
however, with a minority of jurisdictions that prorate the loss after dis-
missing both the escape and excess clauses as repugnant.9 5 Nevertheless,
the holding emphasizes the weighty obligation placed on employee health
plan fiduciaries in delivering anticipated benefits. 96
90. See id. at 164 (holding that escape clauses in ERISA-governed plans are
unenforceable as matter of law); see also OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 4,
§ 11.03[d] [1] [c], at 508 (stating that majority of courts hold that policy containing
escape clause is primarily liable for loss, while policy containing excess clause will
be held to provide only excess insurance); see, e.g., Michigan Alkali Co. v. Banker's
Indem. Ins. Co., 103 F.2d 345, 348 (2d Cir. 1939) (holding that policy issuing
escape clause was primarily liable); see also Insurance Co. v. Continental Cas. Co.,
575 F.2d 1070, 1072 (3d Cir. 1978) (following reasoning in Michigan Alkali).
91. See Northeast, 764 F.2d at 162 (relying on policy considerations in declaring
escape clauses unenforceable) (citing Insurance Co., 575 F.2d at 1070; Grasberger v.
Liebert & Obert, Inc., 6 A.2d 925 (Pa. 1939) (holding excess clause prevailed over
escape clause because excess clause did not cover insured's primary loss)).
92. See Northeast, 764 F.2d at 164 (holding ILGWU Fund primarily liable be-
cause escape clauses are unenforceable as matter of law).
93. See id. at 164 n.17 (positing other available remedies).
94. See id. ("[W]e are concerned that even a qualified endorsement of escape
clauses might encourage benefit plans with excess or coordination of benefits
clauses to replace such clauses with those of the escape variety in order to 'fight
fire with fire.'").
95. See 8A J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 49.10, at 458 n.1
(1981) (noting minority rule of proration).
96. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (c) (1994). Congress set forth its declaration of policy
in ERISA by stating:
It is hereby further declared to be the policy of this chapter to protect...
the interests of participants in private pension plans and their benefi-
ciaries by improving the equitable character and the soundness of such
plans by requiring them to vest the accrued benefits of employees.., to
meet minimum standards of funding, and by requiring plan termination
insurance.
Id.
The Northeast court affirmatively placed the onus of honest dealing on the
plan trustee as the court recognized the complexity of "other insurance" law and
the tendency for the average beneficiary not to make informed choices. See North-
east, 764 F.2d at 163-64 n.16.
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A decade later, the Third Circuit abandoned its earlier devotion to
state common law.9 7 In McGurl, the court lent credence to the proposi-
tion that a federal statute charging the development of federal common
law implicitly envisions some degree of national uniformity.98 As the court
stated, "[I] t would make little sense to adopt a state law rule, which Con-
gress has chosen to preempt, as a matter of federal common law."9 9 In
discarding state law, the court noted that the need to fashion federal com-
mon law stems from the inability to pose before Congress every possible
scenario that arises under ERISA.
With a license to craft new law, the court embarked upon a task of
first impression in the federal courts.100 Following the two-step analysis
set forth in Starks and adopted in Northeast, the district court in McGurl
commenced with an analysis of the parties' intentions. 10 1 The court deter-
mined that the defendant's policy contained an escape clause and, in ac-
cordance with Northeast, declared the clause unenforceable. 10 2 It is at this
point that the fact patterns of Northeast and McGurl diverge.103 Once the
Northeast court struck the escape clause from the defendant's policy, the
remaining language clearly assigned primary liability to the defendant.
10 4
In McGurl, however, the policy still assumed only secondary liability after
97. See McGurl v. Trucking Employees of N. Jersey Welfare Fund, Inc., 124
F.3d 471, 480-86 (3d Cir. 1997) (embracing uniform federal rule instead of state
law).
98. See id. at 480 ("'[T]he desirability of a uniform rule is plain' where 'identi-
cal transactions subject to the vagaries of the laws of the several states' would lead
to great diversity in results." (quoting Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318
U.S. 363, 367 (1943))). The Third Circuit realized that this is the case when a
federal statute is at issue militating uniformity. See id.
99. McGurl v. Teamsters Local 560 Trucking Employees of N. Jersey Welfare
Fund, 925 F. Supp. 280, 288 (D.N.J. 1996) (citing PM Group Life Ins. Co. v. West-
ern Growers Assurance Trust, 953 F.2d 543, 546 (9th Cir. 1992)).
100. See McGurl, 124 F.3d at 473 (noting that case at bar posed question of
first impression in federal courts).
101. See McGur 925 F. Supp. at 285 (noting that court must first discern in-
tent of parties and then determine whether such intent comports with underpin-
nings of ERISA).
102. See McGurl, 124 F.3d at 477 ("According to the analysis in Northeast, there-
fore, this provision in the TENJ Fund [defendant] plan is an unenforceable escape
clause.").
103. See id. Note that here, once the unenforceable escape clause is stricken
from defendant's plan, the court is still left with a dilemma in assigning liability.
See id. The court noted that the two plans were nonetheless mutually repugnant.
See id. Conversely, in Northeast, once the court declared the escape clause unen-
forceable and struck it from the party's plan, that plan naturally assumed liability
due to no further conflicting language. See Northeast Dep't ILGWU Health & Wel-
fare Fund v. Teamsters Local Union No. 229 Welfare Fund, 764 F.2d 147, 164 (3d
Cir. 1985).
104. See Northeast, 764 F.2d at 164 ("In the absence of its escape clause, the
ILGWU plan is the primary insurer of Mrs. Fazio's medical expenses under its own
terms and the terms of the Teamsters plan.").
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the escape clause was struck from the defendant's policy.105 This was due
to the fact that the relevant portion of the policy was reduced to the fol-
lowing phrase: "The Plan covering the patient as an employee or in which
the employee is a participant ... will be the primary plan." 0 6 Because
the claimants were not employee beneficiaries of the defendant's plan, the
defendant successfully shielded itself from primary liability.10 7
After the court determined the defendant was not primarily liable,
the court examined different approaches in assigning liability.' 0 8 The
court rejected the pro-rata approach because it imparts undue recognition
and approval of excess clauses. 10 9 Moreover, the court reasoned that the
pro-rata approach sacrifices all certainty because insurers will not be able
to compute their relative risk in the absence of notice of other plans."10
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recognized this
proposition in Auto Owners Insurance Co. v. Thorn Apple Valley' where the
court stated that the pro-rata rule does not comport with "a primary goal
of ERISA, which is to safeguard the financial integrity of qualified plans by
shielding them from unanticipated claims." 1 12
105. See McGurl, 124 F.3d at 477 (positing that both plans are mutually repug-
nant and noting lack of acceptable method of adjudicating parties' intent).
106. McGurl 925 F. Supp. at 287.'
107. See id. at 283. The claimants i're dependents of the primary employee
beneficiaries of the defendant's plan. See id. Therefore, because defendant did
not cover claimants as employees, the defendant could escape primary liability de-
spite the excision of the escape clause in the policy. See id.
108. See McGurl 124 F.3d at 484. The court noted that the two courts of ap-
peals that have addressed the possibility of applying the pro-rata rule have been
divided on its merits. See id. Compare Auto Owners Ins. Co. v. Thorn Apple Valley,
Inc., 31 F.3d 371, 375 (6th Cir. 1994) (considering ERISA-governed plan with no-
fault automobile insurance policy and determining that application of pro-rata
method of apportionment would subvert policies of ERISA), with Winstead v. Indi-
ana Ins. Co., 855 F.2d 430, 431-32- (7th Cir. 1988) (considering conflict between
clauses in ERISA-governed plan and no-fault automobile insurance plan under
auspices of Michigan state law and applying pro-rata method of apportionment).
109. See McGurl, 124 F.3d at 485 ("[E]ven a qualified endorsement of escape
clauses might encourage benefit plans with excess or coordination of benefits
clauses to replace such clauses with those of the escape variety in order to 'fight
fire with fire."' (quoting Northeast, 764 F.2d at 164 n.17)).
110. See id. (opining that pro-rata rule presents many difficulties in apportion-
ment of liability and noting that pro-rata rule exists comfortably in casualty insur-
ance law, but not health insurance law).
111. 31 F.3d 371 (6th Cir. 1994).
112. Id. at 375. But see Winstead, 855 F.2d at 431-32 (applying pro-rata method
of apportionment). In Winstead, the court addressed a conflict between the coor-
dination of benefits in an ERISA-regulated plan and an applicable no-fault auto-
mobile insurance plan. See id. The court apportioned liability based on the pro-
rata rule and cited Third Circuit dictum found in a Northeast footnote. See id. at
434. In Northeast, the court recognized that other courts faced with the same sce-
nario have declared the escape and excess clauses mutually repugnant and have
held both insurers primarily liable for the entire loss on a pro-rata basis. See North-
east, 764 F.2d at 161-62 n.13.
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The Third Circuit chose to adopt the coordination of benefits ap-
proach set forth by the NAIC in its Model Regulation.1 13 The NAIC's rule
is seemingly a panacea amid the chaos of "other insurance" law. 1 4 The
Model Regulation establishes a comprehensive scheme for the orderly co-
ordination of employee benefits.' 1 5 Under the Model Regulation, the
plan covering the claimant as an employee beneficiary assumes primary
responsibility. 116 The plan covering the claimant as a dependent benefici-
ary assumes secondary responsibility."'
Adopted in twenty-four states, the NAIC approach has gained wide-
spread acceptance. 118 Moreover, it more effectively advances the purpose
of ERISA than its alternative, the pro-rata rule, which leaves employers
unable to predict the extent of their own liability.' 1 9 The "employer first"
113. See McGurl 124 F.3d at 484 (noting that district court employed its law-
making power to select NAIC's "employer first" rule); see also PM Group Life Ins.
Co. v. Western Growers Assurance Trust, 953 F.2d 543, 547 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting
that adoption of uniform federal rule best effectuates purpose of ERISA by avoid-
ing confusion and expense). In PM Group, the court considered two self-funded
ERISA plans with incompatible "other insurance" provisions. See id. at 545. The
claimants, husband and wife, were each covered by their respective employee ben-
efit plans. See id. When the couple gave birth to their three month premature
baby girl, it took over four years to collect through their insurance companies for
the expenses incurred. See id. In adjudicating the coordination of benefits dispute
between the insurers of the parents over which insurer should assume primary
liability, the Ninth Circuit relied in part on NAIC regulations to create a uniform
federal common law solution. See id. Under the "birthday rule," the insurer of the
parent whose birthday falls first in the calendar year will assume primary liability.
See id. In establishing a federal common law rule, the court pointed out that the
converse would lead to great confusion among insurance carriers that provide cov-
erage to claimants in several states and are therefore subject to several different
laws. See id. at 547. Another popular competing rule is the "gender rule" which
provides that in all cases, the father's plan will be the primary insurer. See id. at
548.
114. See McGurl 124 F.3d at 486. From a practical standpoint, the "employer
first" rule encourages employees to look uniformly to their employers for reim-
bursement before seeking recompense from other plans. See id. More impor-
tantly, however, the employer first rule imparts a good deal of stability on plan
trustees in assessing their overall potential liability instead of leaving the determi-
nation to an ad hoc judicial decision regarding liability. See id.
115. See NAIC MODEL, supra note 2, § 2. According to the NAIC, the purpose
of the Model Regulation is to "establish a uniform order of benefit determination
under which plans pay claims." Id. § 2(B). Additionally, the Model Regulation
serves to reduce delays made by insurance carriers in paying claims due to the
disputes among competing plans. See id. § 2(E).
116. See id. § 5(D)(1) ("The plan that covers the person other than as a de-
pendent, for example as an employee, member, subscriber or retiree, is primary
and the plan that covers the person as a dependent is secondary.").
117. See id.
118. See McGur4 124 F.3d at 483 (citing Jack B. Helitzer, State Developments in
Employee Benefits: State Adoption of Coordination of Benefits Rules, 4 BENEFITS L.J. 435,
442-43 (1991)).
119. See id. at 492-93 (positing that pro-rata rule fosters unpredictability and
uncertainty among insurance carriers and their respective beneficiaries).
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rule is consistent with industry practice and it soundly effectuates the poli-
cies of ERISA.120
V. CONCLUSION
The culture that has evolved in the Third Circuit's jurisprudence of
"other insurance" clauses is one that impugns the requisite logic and fore-
thought necessary to adjudicate such intricate disputes. The Third Circuit
has ruled aggressively, while duly noting the importance of formulating
common law both incrementally and empirically. 121 Regarding ERISA,
the Third Circuit has helped to secure adequate certainty for employers
that are continually faced with paying disavowed claims. On the other
hand, the holdings also advance the interests of the employees in collect-
ing anticipated coverage.
As one commentator noted, adoption of the "employer first" rule in
coordination of benefits determinations formalizes the only practical solu-
tion to the conundrum of "other insurance" provisions. 122 Virtually all
insurance practitioners employ the rule regardless of its legal status.123
The Third Circuit's holding in McGurl merely recognizes industry practice
and ensures its uniform application in the resolution of disputes under
ERISA-governed plans.
In 1992, Judge Kosinski of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit mused, "The next worst thing to having no insurance at all is
having two insurance companies cover the same claim.' 24 The federal
common law developed by the Third Circuit will certainly help to cure this
evil and slowly close the legislative gaps that plague ERISA.
Aileen A. Dowd
120. See McGurl v. Teamsters Local 560 Trucking Employees of N. Jersey Wel-
fare Fund, 925 F. Supp. 280, 293 (D.N.J. 1996) (noting that "employer first" rule
comports with state practice and goals of ERISA).
121. See id. at 289 ("'[T]he common law decision making process is inher-
ently incremental by nature .... .' (quoting PM Group Life Ins. Co. v. Western
Growers Assurance Trust, 953 F.2d 543, 547 (9th Cir. 1992))).
122. See Helitzer, supra note 118, at 436 (noting practicality of "employer first"
rule in resolution of employee benefit disputes).
123. See id. ("Virtually all insurers and plan administrators follow the practical
resolution, and even if they are not sophisticated enough to figure out the solu-
tion, they will reach the proper conclusion sooner or later.").
124. PM Group, 953 F.2d at 544.
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